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Abstract: This paper aims to analytically and graphically explore the characteristics of ASEAN+3’s 
trade and FDI integration over the period 1990-2012 by applying the tools of network analysis. Our 
results first find evidence that the degree of trade and FDI integration varies among ASEAN+3 
member states over the observation period. Second, ASEAN+3’s intra-regional trade network seems to 
be more densely connected than its intra-regional FDI network. Third, we reveal that large and/or 
advanced countries tend to be better linked and to form a sub-regional bloc of tightly connected 
economies. Therefore, ASEAN+3 has been experiencing a widening gap in the trend and patterns of 
intra-regional trade and FDI among country members at different levels of economic development.  
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1. Introduction 
Southeast Asian countries formed a political, economic and cultural alliance on 8 August 
1967 called Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN).1 Since its establishment, ASEAN 
has promoted an open-regionalism principle in order to ensure trade liberalization among 
country members and enhance trade and investment integration with particular non-
members. Based on the principle of open market economy and rule-based system, ASEAN 
has become a dynamic trade zone and an important region for foreign investors to put their 
real and portfolio investments.  
Apart from the initiatives above, ASEAN has also committed to the enlargement of ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) to non-member countries. According to ASEAN members, who are 
opposed to direct Bilateral Free Trade Agreement (BFTA) between an individual member 
state and a non-member state, the enlargement of AFTA through an “ASEAN + framework” 
has been the best way to strengthen ASEAN’s regional cooperation with non-members. The 
ASEAN economic performances in the last decade explained the attractiveness of the 
“ASEAN + framework” and the willingness of non-members states to join it. Besides, being 
the third largest population in the world, after China and India, ASEAN has an important 
potential market demand and a large potential productive labor supply. In addition, the 
comparative advantages among ASEAN countries may allow building up complementary 
production networks in Southeast Asia. In other words, these features allow ASEAN to 
expand its regionalism wings to other Asian countries and then to establish BFTAs with non-
member states in order to join its economic cooperation. Among others, ASEAN+3, which 
covers ten ASEAN member states and three East Asian countries (China, Japan and Korea), 
has been considered as the most successful model of “ASEAN + framework”. The ASEAN+3 
is also the latest development of East Asian regional cooperation from trade, investment to 
financial cooperation. According to Urata (2007), free trade arrangements in East Asian 
region through ASEAN+3 attempt to generate “trade creation” instead of “trade diversion”. 
Still, a better understanding of the integration process and its evolution within the ASEAN 
or the “ASEAN + 3” is opportune.   
The present paper tends to gain a better understanding of economic integration in ASEAN+3 
by employing a network analysis. In the literature, a network analysis has been recently used 
to study the relevant issues of international trade (e.g. Fagiolo et al., 2007; Iapadre and Tajoli, 
2014). The main argument of network analysis is to show trade relations as a network, in 
                                                          
1 Five ASEAN founding members are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Membership 
has now extended to include Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam.  
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which countries play the role of nodes and a link indicates the presence of an import/export 
relation between any two countries. Fagiolo et al. (2007) argue that a network approach 
enhances our understanding of international economics because it allows investigating the 
whole structure of interactions among countries and to explore connections, paths and 
circuits. The authors also indicate that while standard statistics are only able to capture the 
ﬁrst order relationships, a network analysis can analyze the second- and higher-order 
relationships. Furthermore, according to Kali and Reyes (2007), the statistical properties of 
network analysis can also explain the dynamics of macroeconomic variables related to 
globalization, growth and ﬁnancial contagion.  
Employing a network analysis, the present paper has triple purposes. The first one is to 
advance our understanding of the interdependence among ASEAN+3 countries through the 
construction of a series of network indicators. The second one is to address the question of 
which countries play the central role in ASEAN+3 economic network. Lastly, we are 
interesting in investigating whether ASEAN and ASEAN+3 are complementary or 
substitutionary. On the other hand, our empirical study also seeks to contribute to the related 
literature in two ways. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to perform a 
detailed network analysis on trade integration in ASEAN+3. Second, we extend the network 
approach to analyze the investment connection, which is captured by foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows among ASEAN+3 countries.   
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the concerned 
literature on network analysis. Section 3 provides an overview on ASEAN+3’s integration 
process in terms of both trade and investment. Section 4 explains the methodological 
approach. Section 5 presents and analyzes the empirical results. Concluding remarks are in 
Section 6.    
 
2. Network analysis in economic integration 
Since long ago, international economists have considered international trade as a network. 
From a network perspective, the trade flow of goods and services between two countries can 
be simply described by a line connecting two vertices representing the two trading countries. 
Looking at trade ﬂows as a network allows to analyze either the relationship between the 
countries in the network or the overall network structure. Because of this benefit, the 
network analysis has been widely used in the literature to investigate the international trade 
relations. In a seminal paper, Snyder and Kick (1979) address world-system/dependency 
theories of differential economic growth among countries. The authors present a block-
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model of the world system basing on four types of international networks: trade flows, 
military interventions, diplomatic relations, and conjoint treaty memberships. Through this 
model, Snyder and Kick provide strong evidence for a “core-semi-periphery-periphery” 
structure of international trade network. Following this work, Smith and White (1992) use a 
quantitative network analysis of international commodity trade flows (1965, 1970, and 1980) 
to measure the structure of the world economic system and to identify the roles of each 
nation in the global division of labor. They find evidence of the change both in the overall 
structure of the world economy and in the positions of particular countries. This change can 
be characterized by: (i) an enlargement of the core countries; (ii) a reduction of within-core 
distance; (iii) and the progressive marginalization of peripheral countries.   
Differing from the two above studies, Kim and Shin (2002) focus on the issue of globalization 
and regionalization by applying social network analysis for longitudinal data on 
international commodity trade. Three important findings can be drawn from this work. First, 
the world became increasingly globalized between 1959 and 1996. Second, the structure of 
the world trade network became decentralized over time. Third, intra-regional density and 
ties are greater than interregional density and ties. In the same vein, Kastelle et al. (2006) 
tend to operate and measure the concept of globalization by using complex systems network 
analysis with longitudinal trade data over the period 1938-2003. The authors argue that, 
while some important aspects of the international trade network have been remarkably 
stable over the period of interest, several network measures have changed substantially over 
the same time.  
The architecture of globalization is also examined in Kali and Reyes (2007), who map the 
topology of the international trade network and also provide new network-based measures 
of international economic integration, at both global system-wide level and local country-
level. On the one hand, the authors show that in terms of participation and influence in the 
network, global trade is hierarchical with a core-periphery structure at meaningful levels of 
trade, though smaller countries’ economic integration into the network increased 
considerably over the 1990’s. On the other hand, the position of a country in the network has 
substantial implications for economic growth. In addition, the network position of a country 
is a substitute for its physical capital but a complement to its human capital.  
In Benedictis and Tajoli (2010), the tools of network analysis are also used to assess the 
characteristics of international trade networks. The authors suggest that the structure of 
international trade networks differs across manufacturing industries that employ different 
types and amounts of intermediate inputs. Accordingly, the structure of some industries’ 
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trade flows gives rise to a dense, widespread network with many links, while others 
experience a centered network, organized around hubs that centrally coordinate the flows. 
The authors also find evidence of a positive correlation between the use of differentiated 
intermediate inputs and the network complexity. In a subsequent work, Benedictis and Tajoli 
(2011) analyze the evolution of the world trade structure. On the one hand, they study the 
role of the entrance of a number of new important players into the world trading system in 
changing the main characteristics of the existing structure of world trade. On the other hand, 
the authors aim to address the question of whether the changes in the world trade structure 
are related to the multilateral or the regional liberalization policies. The authors find that the 
level of world trade integration has been increasing but still far from being complete, with 
the exception of some areas, which have experienced a strong heterogeneity in the countries' 
choice of partners. Moreover, they also conclude the relevant role of WTO in trade 
integration.  
More recently, Iapadre and Tajoli (2014) analyze the role played by the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) in the world trade network, as well as in their regions. They find that the 
regional role played by each of the BRICs is different. China plays a role of export hub in 
South-East Asia, importing intermediate goods from the rest of the region and exporting 
final goods to the rest of the world, while Brazil, India and Russia seem to be the dominant 
local suppliers in their regions, exporting to the region and importing from the rest of the 
world. Iapadre and Tajoli (2014) also conclude that the BRICs are the most globalized 
countries in terms of connectivity to the world trading system in each of their respective 
regions.  
In the international economics literature, the network analysis has been also used to study 
other relevant issues apart from trade integration. For instance, Fagiolo et al. (2007) exploit 
both binary and weighted network approaches to compare the degree and patterns of trade 
and financial integration. The authors show that the trade network is almost fully connected 
while international financial integration is less pervasive. In addition, the level of 
international financial integration varies with asset type: it is highest for long-term debt 
contracts, somewhat lower for equities and rather low for short-term debt. Differing from 
Fagiolo et al. (2007), Kali and Reyes (2010) use these network-based measures of 
connectedness to explain stock market returns during the financial crisis. They find that a 
financial crisis is amplified if the epicenter country is better integrated into the trade 
network. However, an affected country may dissipate the negative impact if it is well 
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integrated into the network. The authors also conclude the role of network analysis in 
providing an improved explanation of financial contagion.  
Overall, the existing literature reveals that using network analysis to analyze international 
trade issues might yield interesting insights. However, until now the tools of network 
analysis are mostly applied to study the trade network structure at the world level. 
Therefore, we use network analysis to shed light on the changes in the trade network 
structure at the regional level through a case study of ASEAN+3. In addition, the present 
paper also tends to contribute to the existing literature by employing network analysis to 
gain a better understanding of economic integration in ASEAN+3 in terms of FDI flows.  
3. Integration and ASEAN + 3 
We begin with a discussion on the globalization level of each country in ASEAN+3. It is 
noteworthy that globalization can be interpreted as manifold dimensions. As defined in 
Dreher et al. (2008), globalization includes three dimensions: economic globalization2; social 
globalization3; and political globalization4. Dreher et al. (2008) also introduce the KOF Index 
of Globalization covering all three dimensions of globalization. The KOF index defines 
globalization to be the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-
continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and 
ideas, capital and goods.  
Figure 1: KOF Globalization index of ASEAN + 3 
 
                                                          
2 Economic globalization is characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as 
information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges. 
3 Social globalization is expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images and people. 
4 Political globalization is defined as a diffusion of government policies 
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Source: Authors’ creation from KOF Index  
From Figure 1, all ASEAN+3 countries show a substantial increase in the KOF index over the 
period 1970-2012. Despite of a common increasing trend, Figure 1 also displays the 
heterogeneity of globalization processes among ASEAN+3 countries. Among others, China 
has experienced a remarkable change in its KOF index. China’s KOF index started from the 
lowest level in 1970 but has been sustained over a longer period. By contrast, the KOF index 
of the country with a low economic development level, such as Lao PDR and Myanmar, has 
been still small. This is probably due to the fact that the globalization process seems to be 
more favored in a country with strong economic performance.  
 
Table 1: Share of ASEAN+3’s trade flows  
Year 
 
 
Exports 
 
Imports 
ASEAN 
 
ASEAN+3 
 
ASEAN 
 
ASEAN+3 
World 
(%) 
East Asia  
& Pacific 
(%) 
 
World 
(%) 
East Asia 
 & Pacific 
(%) 
 
World 
(%) 
East Asia  
& Pacific 
(%) 
 
World 
(%) 
East Asia  
& Pacific 
(%) 
1980 3.7 25.5 
 
12.8 88.4 
 
3.4 26.2 
 
12.9 90.7 
1990 4.3 25.3 
 
13.3 78.7 
 
4.2 29.7 
 
14.2 80.8 
2000 5.7 27.4 
 
16.7 80.9 
 
5.2 32.1 
 
16.1 80.7 
2005 6.1 24.8 
 
20.4 83.1 
 
5.6 30.2 
 
18.4 81.6 
2010 6.5 22.2 
 
25.0 85.3 
 
6.0 28.1 
 
21.2 82.3 
2013 6.7 21.3 
 
26.9 85.8 
 
6.2 26.3 
 
23.6 82.9 
Source: Authors’ computation from WDI data 
We now turn our attention to ASEAN+3 integration in terms of both trade and FDI flows at 
regional level. In fact, ASEAN+3 has long enjoyed a market driven expansion of trade and 
FDI. Over the past two decades, the region’s trade and FDI have expanded rapidly. As 
shown in Table 1, ASEAN+3’s exports rose from 12.8% of the world total exports in 1980 to 
26.9% in 2013, while its imports expanded from 14.2% to 23.6% during 1990-2013. ASEAN+3 
has also played a central role in regional trade integration. In 2013, the share of ASEAN+3 in 
regional exports and imports reached to 85.8% and 82.9% respectively.  
Table 2: Share of ASEAN+3’s FDI inflows 
Year 
 
 
FDI inflows 
 
FDI outflows 
ASEAN 
 
ASEAN+3 
 
ASEAN 
 
ASEAN+3 
World 
(%) 
East Asia  
& Pacific 
(%) 
 
World 
(%) 
East Asia 
 & Pacific 
(%) 
 
World 
(%) 
East Asia  
& Pacific 
(%) 
 
World 
(%) 
East Asia  
& Pacific 
(%) 
1980 4.4 47.9 
 
9.2 54.0 
 
- - 
 
- - 
1990 6.3 43.3 
 
14.6 64.5 
 
- - 
 
- - 
2000 1.8 14.6 
 
12.1 49.8 
 
- - 
 
- - 
2005 3.2 22.2 
 
14.2 89.6 
 
1.4 19.0 
 
7.4 99.4 
2010 5.8 19.7 
 
29.3 75.5 
 
3.5 23.9 
 
14.5 68.6 
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2013 7.4 20.5 
 
36.1 78.3 
 
3.6 15.9 
 
22.4 81.9 
Source: Authors’ computation from WDI data 
On the other hand, ASEAN+3 has been also the most important destination of FDI. FDI flows 
into ASEAN+3 more than doubled from 14.6% of the world total FDI inflows in 1990 to 
29.3% in 2010 and reached the peak of 36.1% in 2013, while outward FDI of ASEAN+3 
considerably increased from 7.4% to 22.4% of the world total outflows over the period 2005-
2010.  
Table 3: Structure of ASEAN+3 trade activities (% of total trade flows) 
Partners 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2010 
Export  Import  
 
Export  Import  
 
Export  Import  
Intra-ASEAN 22.8 21.1 
 
25.3 24.5 
 
28.2 26.6 
Extra-ASEAN 77.2 78.9 
 
74.7 75.5 
 
71.8 73.4 
China  3.5 5.2 
 
8.1 10.6 
 
11.3 12.4 
Japan 12.3 18.8 
 
11.2 14.1 
 
11.1 10.8 
Korea 3.5 4.4 
 
3.8 4.1 
 
4.8 5.5 
             Source: Authors’ computation from ASEAN Secretariat 
ASEAN+3’s global expansion of trade has been accompanied by rising intra-regional 
concentration of trade activities. As reported in Table 3, ASEAN+3’s trade activities are 
significantly characterized by trade flows between the country members. For instance, intra-
regional exports as a share of ASEAN’s total exports increased from 22.8% in 2000 to 28.2% 
in 2010, while intra-ASEAN imports also expanded from 21.1%% to 26.6% during 2000-2010. 
In addition, the trade flows between ASEAN and China, Japan, and Korea have also 
experienced a substantially upward trend over the last decade, which is probably due to the 
establishment of ASEAN+3 in 1997.   
Table 4: FDI sources of ASEAN+3 (% of total inward FDI) 
Country sources 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Intra-ASEAN 10.0 13.9 12.7 20.1 13.8 16.1 
Extra-ASEAN  90.0 86.1 87.3 79.9 86.2 83.9 
China 1.5 1.8 2.3 4.0 10.9 3.8 
Japan 16.3 18.4 11.7 8.8 9.8 11.0 
Korea 1.3 2.2 3.6 3.4 3.5 4.9 
EU 27.7 23.6 24.6 14.9 23.9 22.3 
U.S 7.9 5.4 11.0 7.5 10.7 11.3 
Source: Authors’ computation from ASEAN Secretariat 
Differing from intra-regional concentration of trade activities, the main sources of 
ASEAN+3’s inward FDI come from both intra and extra-regional countries. Table 4 shows 
that firms from the major industrialized countries are the main investors in ASEAN. Indeed 
multinational firms from the European Union (EU), the U.S and Japan provide around 40% 
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of total inward FDI into ASEAN over the period 2005-2010. On the other hand, firms from 
ASEAN countries firms have also begun to invest in other member states. For instance, intra-
ASEAN FDI flows peaked at 20.1% in 2008 and then dropped to 16.1% in 2010 due to the 
global financial turmoil. Overall, the recent share of intra-ASEAN FDI flows is still lower 
than that of extra-ASEAN FDI flows.  
According to Kawai and Wignaraja (2007), several factors can explain the expansion of trade 
and FDI ASEAN+3 economies. First, ASEAN+3 economies have pursued trade and 
investment liberalization as part of their outward-oriented trade and FDI policies within the 
multilateral framework. Second, investing into ASEAN+3 allow multinational firms to 
former their production networks and supply chains throughout this dynamic region. Third, 
improving physical and digital connectivity and developing logistics support services in East 
Asia over the past two decade have reduced trade costs of conducting cross-border business 
and thus encouraged trade and investment activities in the region. Fourth, the remarkable 
economic growth of the largest emerging market, notably China, has also been considered as 
an important factor contributing to closer economic linkages among ASEAN+3 member 
states. 
 
4. Methodological approach 
 
In this paper, to achieve our research objectives, we employ a broad set of indicators, which 
have been widely addressed in the literature.   
 
4.1. Intensity indices 
According to Iapadre and Tajoli (2014), the trade intensity is a simpler approach, in which 
the intensity indices are measured by a comparison between actual bilateral trade and a 
properly defined benchmark. Iapadre and Tajoli (2014) also argue that trade intensity indices 
can be used to assess possible hierarchical structures in the geography of international trade, 
such as core-periphery or hub-and-spoke patterns. On the other hand, intensity indices also 
allow one to investigate the tendency of countries belonging to the same region to trade 
relatively more between each other (intra-regional trade) than with the rest of the world 
(inter-regional trade) (Iapadre and Plummer, 2011).  
The trade intensity can be considered as equivalent with the revealed comparative advantage 
index developed by Balassa (1965). In this vein, the trade intensity is formulized as follows: 
10 
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        (1) 
where     is a partner country j’s share of the reporting country i’s total trade,    is its share 
of the word trade,    : is total bilateral trade between reporting country i  and partner 
country j,     is trade between reporting country i and the world,     is trade between 
country j and the world, and     is the total world trade.  
Contrary to the abundant literature on the trade intensity indices, there is no clear theoretical 
foundation for the FDI intensity. So that, to measure the intensity of FDI relationship, we 
reuse the idea of bilateral trade intensity index to construct our FDI intensity indices as 
follows:  
     
    
   
 
    
    
⁄
    
    
⁄
        (2) 
where      is a partner country j’s share of the reporting country i’s total FDI,    is its share 
of the word FDI,     : is total FDI flows between reporting country i  and partner country j, 
     is FDI flows between reporting country i and the world,      is FDI flows between 
country j and the world, and      is the total world FDI.  
To calculate the FDI intensity, we use FDI stocks instead of FDI flows for two reasons. First, 
FDI stocks represent the long-term investment position of host and home country, while FDI 
flows represent the annual investment position, especially in the case of small countries. 
Second, the value of FDI stock, which is accumulated flows, in almost cases is positive. By 
contrast, calculating the FDI intensity in the case of disinvestment, in which the value of FDI 
flows is negative, is not an easy task. According to Iapadre (2006), the traditional 
specifications of intensity indices as formularized above suffer from some limitations: (i) the 
range of bilateral intensity indices is not homogeneous across region and is asymmetric 
around the geographic neutrality threshold; (ii) it is difficult to interpret the dynamic 
changes in intensity indices. To resolve these problems, Iapadre (2006) and Iapadre and 
Tajoli (2014) present another indicator, namely the bilateral revealed trade preference index 
(RTP) among the country members of a region. This index is constructed from the 
homogeneous bilateral intensity index (HIij) and the complementary extra-bilateral intensity 
index (HEij).  
{
 
 
 
 
     
   
   
 
   
   
⁄
   
   
⁄
     
     
     
         (3) 
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where Toj is trade flows between the rest of the word (excluding country i) and country j, Tow 
is trade flows between the rest of the world and the world. Basing on the value of HIij and 
HEij, the RTP index is given as follows:  
      (         )(         )        (4) 
The RTP index varies from -1 (no bilateral trade) to +1 (only bilateral trade) and is equal to 
zero in the case of geographic neutrality. According to Iapadre and Tajoli (2014), this index is 
perfectly symmetric across partner countries and independent of country size.  The authors 
also argue that the RTP index can be also used to map the intensity of trade within a region r. 
In this case, Formulas 4 becomes:  
      (         )(         )        (5) 
On the other hand, we can also determine separately the revealed import and export 
preference indices (RXPir and RMPir, respectively). These two indicators are used to calculate 
the revealed trade leadership index (Iapadre and Tajoli, 2014) as follows;  
      
           
 
       (6) 
The       index allows one to determine the role (local supplier versus export hub) of each 
country member in a specific region.  
 
4.2. Weighted network analysis’ indicators 
 
Network analysis is an application of network theory to analyze the relational data. De 
Benedictis et al. (2013) show that network analysis provides the fundamental information on 
the dyad ij. That is, network analysis is a useful approach to assess the relationship between 
countries in terms of both trade and FDI.  
In ASEAN+3 framework, we consider its trade network as a weighted network, since in the 
binary trade matrix, 100% of links are bilateral and each node has exactly the same number 
of links. By contrast, concerning FDI network, we refer to both binary and weighted network 
analysis, because in the binary FDI matrix, there is approximately 55% of bilateral relations 
and each node has different number of links. In addition, both trade and FDI networks are 
considered as directed complete networks. The main reason is that in ASEAN+3 trade and 
FDI network, every node (or every country) is directly connected to every other node (or 
other country) in both direction.  
To gain better understanding of the connectivity in ASEAN+3 network, we use a broad set of 
centrality measures, which have been widely used in the concerned literature (e.g. Freeman, 
1978; Newman, 2001; Bogartti, 2005; and Opsahl, 2010). The centrality approach, which is 
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based on the number of trade or FDI links of a given country (binary or unweighted  
network) and their strength (weighted network), assesses how well connected a country is to 
the rest of the network, and how influential a country is for a specific region. According to 
Jackson (2010), centrality measures can be classified into four main groups: i) degree 
centrality assessing how a node is connected to others; ii) closeness centrality showing how 
easily a node can be reached by other nodes; iii) betweenness centrality describing how 
important a node is in terms of connecting other nodes; and iv) eigenvector centrality 
measure (or the Bonacich centrality) referring to how important, central, influential and 
tightly clustered a node’s neighbors are. In this paper, we only focus on two indicators, 
notably the degree centrality and the eigenvector centrality, for several reasons. First, all 
links in ASEAN+3 network are directed between two countries. Second, the transactions 
between countries are independent. Third, there is no node (or country) being a part of 
transactions among two nodes. 
Finally, in the weighted networks, we calculate either the absolute values (e.g. flows of 
exports and stocks of FDI) or the relative ones (e.g. flows of exports by GDP and stocks of 
FDI by GDP), which allow us to avoid the excessive impact of the country size. Moreover, it 
also allows better determining the specialization in the overall process of production.  
 
Degree centrality 
Degree centrality is the simplest measure of a node’s position in a network. In a binary 
network, the degree centrality corresponds to the number of connections of each node. In a 
weighted network, the links between nodes are not equivalent and weighted according to 
their strength.  
In a given network, N is the total number of nodes (countries), and aij is the element in the 
trade adjacency matrix A, in which i is the row-indicator corresponding to exporting 
countries, and j is the column-indicator corresponding to importing countries. If aij = 1, the 
two countries i and j are trade partners. If aij = 0, the two countries i and j are not trading 
partners.  In a weighted network described by N x N with the weight matrix A = [aij], in 
which aij > 0 if the link i to j exists, otherwise aij = 0.  
In an unweighted (or binary) network, the centrality of node is measured by the number of 
the connections between nodes.  
CD =∑      ij                       (7) 
Due to the dependence of degree centrality measure on the number of existing nodes in a 
network, it is diﬃcult to compare networks of diﬀerent node-size. According to De 
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Benedictis et al. (2013), it is usually better to calculate the normalized version of CD as 
follows:  
  
  = 
∑    
 
   
(   )
            (8) 
This indicator ranges from 0 to 1, implying that the more is the degree centrality close to 1, 
the more a country is directly connected to the rest of the network. In a directed network, we 
distinguish in-degree centrality and out-degree centrality. In our case, the out-degree is the 
total number of countries to which country i exports its products, the in-degree is the total 
number of countries that export their products to country i.   
{
      
    
∑    
 
   
(   )
     
    
∑    
 
   
(   )
            (9) 
The ratio of these two indicators indicates the relative connectivity of a country in terms of 
inﬂows (with a ratio greater than 1) or outﬂows (with a ratio smaller than 1). Normalizing 
the number of links in Equation 7 by the total number of links L in the network gives the 
following measures: 
{
      
    
∑    
 
   
 
     
    
∑    
 
   
 
                (10) 
In a weighted network, we can also determine the strength centrality (CS) regarding to trade 
volumes between two countries as follows:  
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          (11)     and     
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           (12)        
where wij is, for example, the exports or the exports by GDP from country i to country j while 
wji  imports of country i from country j, and ∑ ∑       ∑ ∑       is the in-strength and out-
strength by total network  trade. In general, the degree and the strength centrality take into 
consideration the direct links of a node and its nearest neighborhood, but ignore the position 
of a node in the network’s structure. 
 
Eigenvector centrality 
The eigenvector centrality index, which is initialed by Bonacich (1972), measures the 
importance of a node in terms of its connection to other central nodes (Iapadre and Tajoli, 
2014). That is, it assigns  relative scores to all nodes in the network based on the principal 
that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node in question 
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than equal connections  to low-scoring nodes. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality of 
country i is defined as the sum of the centrality of its neighbors j scaled by a constant  . In an 
undirected network with adjacency matrix A, the measure (CE) is computed as follows:  
CE(i) =    ∑      CE(j)        (13) 
In a directed network, we can also distinguish:  
- hub centrality: this indicator allows one to determine the high “hub” score country, 
which is the key exporter or investor in the network.  
CE-hub(i) = β∑      CE-autho(j)         (14) 
- authority centrality: this indicator allows one to determine the high “authority” score 
country, which is the key importer of main destination of investment in the network.  
CE-autho(i) = α∑      CE-hub(j)         (15) 
Overall, we use the listed above indicators to analyze the structure of ASEAN+3 network in 
terms of both trade and FDI integration.  
 
 
5. Results 
In this section, we report and analyze the network analysis’ results on trade and FDI 
integration in ASEAN+3. To calculate all network analysis’ indicators listed above, we collect 
our panel data from different international data sources: UN Comtrade; Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); ASEAN; and United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
 
5.1. Trade integration 
 
As mentioned above, we use the network analysis to first study the structure of trade 
integration in ASEAN+3. In Table 5, we report the trade intensity indices. We also report the 
values of trade balance in order to compare the role of each ASEAN+3 member state in 
regional trade system and the world trade system. First, looking at ASEAN’s RTL indices, 
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia can be seen as intra-regional local suppliers. This 
is because their intra-regional trade leadership are positive, especially over the period 1990 - 
1997. By contrast, small and less developed countries, such as Cambodia and Lao, have been 
considered as intra-regional export hubs. Interestingly, Malaysia has experienced a 
downward trend in intra-regional trade introversion, since the country is exporting more to 
the world and becoming export hub in ASEAN. For instance, since 1998 Malaysia’s RTL value 
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has been slightly negative, while its trade balance with the world has been significantly 
positive.  
Second, the participation of China, Korea and Japan has influenced the picture of intra-
regional trade relations. China and Japan have been important intra-regional export hub but 
played a relevant role in supplying goods and services to the rest of the world (except the 
case of Japan from 2011 to 2013). Over the period 2011-2013, we also observe that Korea, 
which was an intra-regional export hub, turned into a local supplier due to opposite change in 
its intra-regional import and export preferences. Regarding the role of founding ASEAN 
country members, Singapore maintains its role as local supplier and its strong trade 
integration at regional and global levels.  On the other hand, after the implement of 
ASEAN+3, both intra-regional import and export preferences of most ASEAN countries have 
dropped due to the market share with large economies (China, Japan and Korea), with the 
exception of Brunei Darussalam.  
<Insert Table 5> 
The patterns of ASEAN+3’s trade network are also reflected through a set of centrality 
indices. As mentioned in the methodological section, each country in ASEAN+3 has the 
bilateral trade relationship with other member states. So that, we only compute the weighted 
degree centrality index, which is formulated in Equation 11. The result is reported in Table 6, 
in which the weighted degree centralities are summarized in columns n-outdegree and n-
indegree. For instance, the average flow of Japan’s exports and imports is 7,915.29 and 
6,111.64 million US dollars respectively over the period 1990 -1997. Together with the 
weighted degree centrality indices, their ranking indicates the integration level of each 
country in ASEAN+3’s trade network. Furthermore, we can also observe the changes in 
ASEAN+3’s trade structure over the observation period. According to Table 6a, and using 
the flows of exports as the weights for the network, China, Japan and Korea are the most 
integrated country in the regional trade network. In particular, Japan and Korea have always 
played a central role in the trade network in both cases with or without ASEAN+3 creation. 
Not surprisingly, the role of China in the regional trade network has changed since 2006 due 
to its official integrated activities into ASEAN+3.  As shown in Table 6b, when taking in 
account the flows of exports by GDP, the role of China and Japan appears much more 
asymmetric. They rank respectively second and first in terms of In-Degree but 12th and 13th 
for the Out-Degree. This result clearly shows that China and Japan are main importers from 
the ASEAN+3 area, but they mainly export outside the ASEAN+3. So, China and Japan due 
to the importance of their exports and imports are the more central countries in the network 
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with an outside ASEAN strategy for their sales in foreign markets.  These results confirm the 
previous ones and their role of an intra-regional export hub. 
Regarding other member states, founding ASEAN country members, such as Singapore and 
Malaysia, have also maintained an important position in the regional trade system. The trade 
position of Singapore in the weighted network is opposite to the Chinese one (see Table 6b 
and Figure 2) being an important exporter to the ASEAN+3 countries and a less central 
importer. Comparing to Singapore, Brunei Darussalam is not a central country in terms of 
absolute values of exports and imports from and to ASEAN+3 Countries, but the country 
also experiences a strong asymmetric position by ranking second in the out-degree measure 
and 13th in the in-degree. By contrast, Figure 2 shows a more symmetric position in the Trade 
Network of other ASEAN+3 countries, such as Korea, which however tends to be out-
ASEAN market oriented as China and Japan. Regarding the case of Indonesia, the country 
moved from an export oriented position within the ASEAN+3 to an import oriented one, as 
China. Meanwhile, with the small value of degree centrality indices, less developed 
countries, such as Cambodia, Lao and Myanmar, have only played a peripheral in ASEAN+3 
network with no clear positions.  
 
<Insert Table 6a and 6b and Figure 2> 
 
The center-periphery picture of ASEAN+3’s trade network is also drawn by the weighted 
eigenvector index. This index allows us to analyze the interdependence among ASEAN+3 
countries and resolve the question of which countries play the most central role in ASEAN+3 
economic network. We present the results of eigenvector centrality indices in Tables 7a and 
7b, in which the country with the highest value of eigenvector centrality is the most 
connected one in the network.   
 
<Insert Table 7a and 7b> 
 
Again, two stories can be set out depending on the ways we weight the network. Using the 
absolute values of exports from a country to another one, the eigenvector, hub and authority 
indices are reproduced in Table 7a.  In Table 7b, similar calculations are made using the 
relative values (e.g. X/GDP) in order to take in account the country size. We first discuss the 
results reported in Table 7a, then those reported in Table 7b.  
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As expected, looking at the eigenvector centrality index in table 7a, Japan is ranked first 
during the period from 1990 to 2005, meaning that this country is very well connected to all 
other countries in the region. From 1990 to 1997, with the value of normalized index of 55.53, 
Korea ranks second because of its strong link with Japan, the most important node in the 
network. Following Korea, the third position of Singapore confirms that this country is well 
connected to with Japan, Korea as well as other central countries in ASEAN+3. Over the 
period 1998 - 2005, China improved its positions in the network, from the fourth to the 
second most central node. Since 2006 with the official integration in ASEAN+3, China has 
occupied the most central role. By contrast, small countries, such as Cambodia, Lao, 
Myanmar and Vietnam, are still far from the influence of China as well as of Japan and 
Korea. Besides the eigenvector index, Table 7b also reports the values of hub and authority 
centrality indices describing the trade flows’ direction: country with a high hub value is a key 
exporter, while country with high authority value is a main imports destination. In this 
regard, Japan plays a role as the first hub in ASEAN+3, following by China and Korea and 
Singapore. Regarding the authority index, again top dominated countries with highest score 
are the triangle China – Japan – Korea.  
The results on authority index and eigenvector index reported in Table 7b does not change 
the main previous conclusions. . However, with respect to the Hub index, and as measured 
by their values of exports by GDP, China, Japan and to a less extent Korea, are no more 
exporters to the ASEAN+3 countries. They are strongly specialized as a hub but for outside 
the ASEAN+3 region. Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei are the key exporters to the 
region, while the positions of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Myanmar are more 
symmetric.  
 
 
<Insert Figure 2> 
 
Apart from the results discussed above, intra-regional trade connectivity can be also 
visualized through the use of mapping, which shows the intense relationships among 
country members. As displayed in Figure 2, each country is represented by a node and 
labeled with its name. The arrows present the direction of links, exports or imports. The size 
of ties is strength of trade flow between two countries. the picture of ASEAN+3’s trade 
relationships highlights some significant trend through three milestones 1995, 2005 and 2013: 
(i) the leading role of China, Japan and Korea in intra-regional trade; (ii) the change in trade 
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structure before and after official implement of ASEAN+3; (iii) an increasing trend in 
connectivity to the network of peripheral countries such as Philippines, Vietnam and 
Cambodia. Figure 2 also shows that in 1995, founding ASEAN countries, notably Singapore, 
Malaysia and Thailand were still closed to the triangle China – Japan – Korea, and 
dominated ASEAN trade system. However, ten years later, these three countries moved 
farther from the central places. Similarly, the group of small countries has remained such an 
important distance from the central network. Overall, despite a rising trend in intra-regional 
trade integration level, the participation of large and/or advanced countries, notably Japan, 
China and Korea, in a common trade bloc – ASEAN+3, seems to dominate trade flows of 
small and less developed countries.  
 
5.2. FDI integration 
 
As mentioned in the introduction section, this paper also tends to apply the tools of network 
analysis to investigate intra-regional FDI connections. We start with a discussion on the FDI 
intensity indices of ASEAN. First, as reported in Table 8, the level of intra-regional FDI 
integration is quite different across the ten country members. For instance, Brunei 
Darussalam and Singapore’s linkages in terms of FDI inflows with ASEAN country members 
appear relatively weak, as the indices of intra-regional inward FDI preference are negative, 
while the main FDI destinations of these two countries are ASEAN regions. By contrast, 
Thailand has experienced a robust connection with ASEAN, since both indices of intra-
regional FDI preferences are strongly positive. Second, there is no common and pronounced 
tendency of regional FDI integration. For instance, intra-regional FDI preferences have 
declined Singapore, particularly on the outward FDI side, while the opposite trend is true in 
the case of Malaysia. Third, our empirical results confirm the dominant role of five ASEAN 
founding members as FDI local suppliers, as the preference index is higher for outward FDI 
than for inward FDI.  
We now turn our attention to the changes in intra-regional FDI integration due to an 
enlargement of ASEAN AFTA (from ASEAN to ASEAN+3). On the one hand, as showed in 
Table 4, ASEAN+3 is characterized by extremely high rates of intra-regional inward FDI 
preference (except the case of Brunei Darussalam). On the other hand, the enlargement of 
ASEAN seems to alter the structure of FDI introversion in East Asia. First, the participation 
of China, Korea and Japan in the “ASEAN + framework” model has modified the position of 
some ASEAN countries in the regional FDI mapping. For instance, instead of being a main 
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FDI supplier in ASEAN, Thailand has become a FDI destination in ASEAN+3. Second, the 
new comer countries, in particular China, have become the main rivals of ASEAN countries 
in attracting intra-regional FDI. Third, China can be seen as a FDI hub in ASEAN+3, which 
could be explained by the fact that larger host country’s market may be associated with 
higher FDI due to larger potential demand and lower costs due to scale economies.    
<Insert Table 8> 
While the results of intensity indices allow us to detect the tendency of intra-regional FDI, 
those of centrality indices are used to assess whether FDI connectivity in the network is 
evenly distributed. To begin with, we report the degree centrality measures in Table 9, in 
which we distinguish weighted and unweighted network. The first index is degree centrality 
measuring how well connected a country to the rest of ASEAN+3 network. We find that in 
terms of both inward and outward FDI, large and/or advanced economies are ranked in the 
first positions. Among others, Singapore has experienced the best place in the network. 
Differing from advanced countries, developing countries appear less connected to the system 
due to their less open economies. On the other hand, Table 9 shows that the FDI position of 
each country in ASEAN+3 do not change much over the time (except the case of Korea).      
<Insert Table 9> 
The second index is strength centrality, which weights the FDI links according their value in 
current U.S. dollars. Table 9 draws a slightly different picture about FDI positions in 
ASEAN+3 network. On the one hand, in terms of inward FDI, China has maintained the first 
rank throughout the observation period, followed by Indonesia over 2001-2006 and by 
Singapore over the recent period. On the other hand, Japan and Singapore plays a central 
role in supplying FDI flows to ASEAN+3 network. In addition, we also reveal that the most 
important FDI flows are mainly transferred between large and/or advanced country 
members. In other words, small and less developed countries are only considered as the 
satellites in regional FDI network.     
A look at the weighted network as measured by the stock of FDI by GDP does not change 
the previous results (see the last part of Table 9). The potential asymmetric position is 
enforced. Hence China, who ranks 5 in Out-degree and 1 in In-Degree, ranks now 9 and 1 
respectively. The position of Japan is more strongly impacted, moving from the first position 
in terms of main capital supplier  to the ASEAN+3 Region, to the 5th one when taking in 
account its level of wealth as measured by GDP. Singapore now becomes the first capital 
exporter in ASEAN+3.  
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The last set of centrality indicators, which are reported in Tables 10a and 10b, assesses not 
only the number and amount of connections, but also the influence of each country on a 
specific network. The values of eigenvector centrality confirm the most important FDI 
positions in FDI network of large and/or advanced economies, in particular China and 
Japan. Nevertheless the position is not as so strong when looking at the absolute values 
(Table 10a) rather than the relative ones (Table 11b).  Anyway, it means that these countries 
are not only very well connected, but also have FDI link with most of relevant players in the 
regional network. By contrast, developing countries are only considered as relatively 
peripheral countries (such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar) with such a small eigenvector 
centrality index.  Singapore is the more connected when taking in account the country size.   
 
<Insert Table 10a and 10b> 
 
Eigenvector centrality is also decomposed into hub score and authority score. This 
decomposition allows one to determine the role in supplying or receiving of a country, in 
FDI network. Not surprisingly, China has been ranked first in terms of authority, implying 
that China has been the most important FDI destination in ASEAN+3. As suggested in a 
survey work released by OECD (2000), the main factors, which make China become an 
attractive destination for foreign investors, can be classified into six sub-categories: (i) 
China’s market size and economic growth performance; (ii) natural and human resource 
endowments; (iii) the infrastructure quality; (iv) the degree of trade openness and access to 
international markets; (v) the institutional quality; and (vi) the investment policies. In terms 
of being a Hub, the position of China is not so good, being at the 7th position in absolute 
value and the 11th one in relative value.  After China, ASEAN emerging countries, notably 
Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore, have occupied the following positions in terms of FDI 
recipients. Looking at the values of hub score, Japan has been the first hub in ASEAN+3 FDI 
network, followed by Korea and Singapore. Taking in account the GDP, Singapore moved to 
the first position. In general, China and Japan play a central role in ASEAN+3’s FDI network: 
China is a leading authority, while Japan is by far the most important supplier.  
 
<Insert Figure 3> 
 
Eigenvector centrality indices also allows us to map FDI distribution in ASEAN+3. The 
width of the link between two countries is proportional to their eigenvector centrality. As 
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displayed in Figure 3, ASEAN+3’s FDI looks geographically segmented, with the central role 
played by three new-comer countries (Japan, Korea, and China), on one side, and ASEAN 
founding member states (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore), on the other side. In 
other words, ASEAN+3’s FDI activities are quite dominated by large and/or advanced 
economies, while developing country members seem to stand outside the crowd. Overall, the 
asymmetry of the FDI map results in an open question about the role of ASEAN+3 in 
coordinating regional FDI flows in order to reduce the inequality of FDI distribution among 
country members.        
 
 
Finally, when comparing the results of the exports and FDI networks, the following facts can 
be highlighted. First, as shown in Table 11b, the correlations between the Out measures (Out-
Degree and Hub) and the In measures (In-Degree and Authority) are strongly negatives 
within the trade network and between trade and financial networks. Within the financial 
network, Out-Degree and In-Degree are not negatively correlated, meaning that ASEAN+3 
countries have a more symmetric position in the financial network. Such a strong 
specialization does not appear in the network weighted by the absolute values (see Table 
11a).  Figure 4 highlights that no country is a hub (resp. Authority) for exports and an 
authority (resp. Hub) for FDI. The asymmetry in the network is measured first by the 
difference between the ranks in Out-degree and In-Degree. A positive (resp. negative) value 
means that the country is mainly an exporter (resp. importer) in the ASEAN+3 area. The 
second measure is the difference between the rankings as a Hub or an Authority. A positive 
value means that the country is mainly a Hub (resp. Authority). As shown in Figure 4 and 
reported in Table 11, no country, except Thailand, appears in the top left and bottom right 
spaces. This implies that no country is at the same time a Hub and an importer, or an 
Authority and an exporter. Regarding the the trade and financial networks’ specialization, 
China’s position, which is clearly in the bottom right space in both networks, means that 
China is importing from the ASEAN+3 countries both goods and capital, while exporting 
outside the Region. By contrast, the position of Japan is not identical in goods and capital 
networks. While Japan is importing goods from ASEAN+3 as China in order to export 
outside the region (e.g. an intra-regional “export hub” for getting outside), in terms of capital 
flows its relationship with the other ASEAN+3 Countries is more symmetric. To a lesser 
extent, Korea is opposite to Japan, being in a more neutral position in the trade network, and 
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a provider of financial capital to the region. At the opposite, Vietnam is mainly an exporter 
of goods to the region, but a capital receiver.   
 
6. Conclusion 
The present paper has investigated the properties of ASEAN+3’s economic integration by 
using both weighted and unweighted network analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this 
paper is also the first one employing the network approach to study FDI integration’s issues 
in a specific economic region. In this regard, our empirical research provides a number of 
important findings.  
First, the level of trade and FDI integration varies among ASEAN+3 member states over the 
observation period. Second, ASEAN+3’s intra-regional trade network is more densely 
connected than its intra-regional FDI network. Third, comparing to standard statistics, 
network analysis allows one to explore not only the first-order but also the second- and 
higher-order trade and FDI relationships of any given country in the world or in a specific 
region. Therefore, following the results of network analysis, we reveal that large and/or 
advanced countries tend to be better linked and to form a sub-regional bloc of tightly 
connected economies. In other words, this paper supports a major evidence that larger and 
richer countries are central players in ASEAN+3’s trade and FDI network. Consequently, 
ASEAN+3 has experienced a widening gap in the trend and patterns of intra-regional trade 
and FDI among country members.  
On the other hand, we also find that the enlargement from ASEAN to ASEAN+3 can be seen 
as a main factor altering the structure of economic integration in East Asia. However, this 
enlargement seems only strengthen trade and FDI connections among large and/or 
advanced economies. This result suggests that ASEAN+3 does not complement, but is 
gradually substituting ASEAN in terms of economic integration, only in favor of founding 
ASEAN countries (Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia) and three new comer 
countries (China, Korea, and Japan).  
A set of policy implications can be derived from our empirical findings. First, ASEAN+3 
policy makers should revisit the existing intra-regional trade and investment agreements in 
order to restructure trade and FDI connections among country members. Second, poorly 
connected nodes (developing countries) should be facilitated to connect to central ones 
(central countries in regional trade and FDI map) and use them as hubs to link with the rest 
of ASEAN+3 network.  
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To conclude, our present research basing on the network approach provides a better 
understanding of the properties of ASEAN+3’s economic integration, but it does not link the 
empirical results with trade and FDI theory. In other words, this work does not attempt to 
test empirically a theoretical model or to address speciﬁcally a trade and FDI issue. 
Therefore, investigating the properties of ASEAN+3’s economic integration via a theoretical 
model will be carried out in our future research.  
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Table 5: Trade intensity indices 
Country 1990 - 1997  1998 - 2005  2006-2010  2011 - 2013 
RIP REP RTL TB  RIP REP RTL TB  RIP REP RTL TB  RIP REP RTL TB 
ASEAN                    
Brunei Darussalam -0.10 -0.22 -0.06 8.57  0.64 0.42 -0.11 25.13  0.89 0.57 -0.16 44.54  0.88 0.47 -0.21 48.32 
Cambodia - - - -15.01  0.81 -0.15 -0.48 -10.21  0.81 0.17 -0.32 -5.88  0.67 0.35 -0.16 -6.39 
Indonesia 0.25 0.46 0.11 1.02  0.67 0.54 -0.07 7.39  0.77 0.58 -0.09 0.34  0.71 0.61 -0.05 -0.72 
Lao PDR - - - -13.74  -0.06 -0.15 -0.05 -10.84  0.95 0.85 -0.05 -8.55  0.93 0.83 -0.05 -2.98 
Malaysia 0.61 0.75 0.07 -0.45  0.71 0.68 -0.02 20.37  0.71 0.68 -0.01 3.39  0.70 0.67 -0.01 12.42 
Myanmar - - - -0.96  0.90 0.86 -0.02 -0.15  0.89 0.89 0.00 0.00  0.86 0.86 0.00 0.00 
Philippines 0.35 0.42 0.04 -6.92  0.57 0.48 -0.04 -6.19  0.69 0.50 -0.09 -1.46  0.62 0.49 -0.07 -3.60 
Singapore 0.64 0.74 0.05 13.59  0.75 0.73 -0.01 21.00  0.72 0.77 0.02 26.30  0.62 0.73 0.06 23.95 
Thailand 0.43 0.61 0.09 -4.84  0.59 0.57 -0.01 7.60  0.61 0.63 0.01 6.48  0.52 0.65 0.07 2.99 
Vietnam - - - -8.11  0.73 0.50 -0.12 -5.97  0.67 0.47 -0.10 -9.74  0.52 0.40 -0.06 1.15 
ASEAN+3                    
Brunei Darussalam -0.17 -0.03 0.07 8.57  0.54 0.65 0.05 25.13  0.80 0.84 0.02 44.54  0.79 0.83 0.02 48.32 
Cambodia - - - -15.01  0.70 -0.57 -0.64 -10.21  0.74 -0.43 -0.59 -5.88  0.60 -0.17 -0.38 -6.39 
Indonesia 0.52 0.67 0.07 1.02  0.64 0.61 -0.02 7.39  0.69 0.60 -0.05 0.34  0.68 0.61 -0.03 -0.72 
Lao PDR - - - -13.74  -0.10 -0.41 -0.16 -10.84  0.90 0.56 -0.17 -8.55  0.90 0.50 -0.20 -2.98 
Malaysia 0.68 0.61 -0.04 -0.45  0.70 0.50 -0.10 20.37  0.67 0.53 -0.07 3.39  0.62 0.57 -0.02 12.42 
Myanmar - - - -0.96  0.92 0.68 -0.12 -0.15  0.90 0.73 -0.08 0.00  0.90 0.79 -0.05 0.00 
Philippines 0.53 0.38 -0.08 -6.92  0.62 0.43 -0.10 -6.19  0.61 0.50 -0.06 -1.46  0.55 0.56 0.00 -3.60 
Singapore 0.65 0.48 -0.08 13.59  0.67 0.52 -0.07 21.00  0.60 0.58 -0.01 26.30  0.45 0.51 0.03 23.95 
Thailand 0.66 0.49 -0.09 -4.84  0.68 0.47 -0.11 7.60  0.64 0.49 -0.08 6.48  0.57 0.50 -0.04 2.99 
Vietnam - - - -8.11  0.77 0.50 -0.13 -5.97  0.76 0.37 -0.20 -9.74  0.73 0.36 -0.19 1.15 
China 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 1.77  0.53 0.19 -0.17 3.07  0.36 -0.03 -0.19 6.48  0.15 -0.08 -0.11 2.62 
Japan 0.34 0.20 -0.07 1.46  0.51 0.25 -0.13 1.49  0.46 0.35 -0.05 0.94  0.39 0.39 0.00 -1.91 
Korea 0.50 0.38 -0.06 -1.20  0.56 0.38 -0.09 6.27  0.50 0.40 -0.05 1.95  0.35 0.44 0.04 3.12 
          Notes: RIP: Revealed import preference; REP: Revealed export preference; RTL: Revealed trade leadership; TB: Trade balance (% of GDP) 
26 
 
 
Table 6a: Trade weighted degree centrality indices (Export values) 
 
 
Country 
  
 1990 - 1997   1998 - 2005  
  
n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank   n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank 
 Brunei Darussalam   179.75 10 131.04 10  225.77 10 103.76 12 
 Cambodia  12.23 12 57.38 12  12.62 12 142.70 11 
 Indonesia  1,759.33 6 1,201.02 7  2,658.31 6 2,316.98 7 
 Lao PDR  6.82 13 25.54 13  10.95 13 85.80 13 
 Malaysia  2,181.13 5 2,679.15 4  3,603.64 5 4,136.91 5 
 Myanmar  44.87 11 116.82 11  110.12 11 196.23 10 
 Philippines  426.23 8 855.67 8  1,179.28 8 1,811.18 8 
 Singapore  3,158.96 2 3,849.24 2  5,596.99 3 5,021.33 4 
 Thailand  1,412.85 7 2,107.35 6  2,592.02 7 2,920.31 6 
 Vietnam  187.67 9 305.49 9  631.78 9 1,010.23 9 
 China  2,767.77 4 2,413.49 5  7,960.26 2 8,156.67 2 
 Japan  7,915.29 1 6,111.64 1  11,390.39 1 10,014.26 1 
 Korea  2,815.25 3 3,014.34 3  5,581.44 4 5,637.21 3 
 
Country 
 2006 – 2010 
  
  2011- 2013 
n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank   n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank 
Brunei Darussalam   541.52 10 277.59 12  802.83 12 553.74 12 
 Cambodia  43.35 13 466.62 10  129.38 10 961.27 11 
 Indonesia  5,655.49 7 6,473.36 6  9,207.84 6 10,865.27 6 
 Lao PDR  56.83 12 172.42 13  191.26 13 424.94 13 
 Malaysia  7,284.98 5 8,174.90 5  10,391.51 5 11,490.16 5 
 Myanmar  329.12 11 460.41 11  588.65 11 1,158.32 10 
 Philippines  1,864.76 8 3,206.95 9  2,340.38 9 4,690.03 9 
 Singapore  13,431.71 3 9,941.89 4  17,065.32 4 12,806.40 4 
 Thailand  6,148.57 6 6,421.43 7  9,323.44 7 10,186.52 7 
 Vietnam  1,811.87 9 3,691.17 8  3,911.22 8 7,493.02 8 
 China  22,642.83 1 24,385.59 1  37,135.44 1 35,790.92 1 
 Japan  21,999.93 2 18,783.33 2  27,315.86 2 26,170.32 2 
 Korea  13,194.96 4 12,550.25 3  21,120.07 3 16,932.27 3 
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Table 6b: Trade weighted degree centrality indices (Exports/GDP values) 
 
 
Country 
  
 1990 - 1997   1998 - 2005  
  
n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank   n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank 
 Brunei Darussalam   2.43 9 0.14 10  3.56 2 0.07 12 
 Cambodia  0.45 12 0.05 12  0.30 13 0.12 10 
 Indonesia  4.09 7 0.54 7  1.45 8 1.47 7 
 Lao PDR  0.27 13 0.02 13  0.59 10 0.04 13 
 Malaysia  15.64 4 2.13 4  3.50 3 2.78 3 
 Myanmar  0.81 11 0.09 11  1.18 7 0.11 11 
 Philippines  2.86 8 0.39 8  1.39 6 0.70 9 
 Singapore  22.07 2 2.80 2  5.73 1 2.95 5 
 Thailand  17.51 3 2.24 3  1.88 4 2.60 4 
 Vietnam  1.27 10 0.16 9  1.57 5 0.64 8 
 China  5.72 6 0.91 6  0.51 11 2.73 2 
 Japan  54.21 1 7.06 1  0.31 12 6.69 1 
 Korea  10.62 5 1.52 5  0.89 9 1.94 6 
 
Country 
 2006 – 2010 
  
  2011- 2013 
n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank   n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank 
Brunei Darussalam   4.40 2 0.06 13  4.84 2 0.08 13 
 Cambodia  0.44 13 0.21 10  0.91 11 0.28 10 
 Indonesia  1.12 9 2.92 4  1.07 8 2.35 6 
 Lao PDR  1.01 10 0.06 12  1.93 6 0.10 12 
 Malaysia  3.52 3 2.60 6  3.43 3 2.37 5 
 Myanmar  1.36 6 0.11 11  0.96 9 0.16 11 
 Philippines  1.17 8 0.74 9  0.94 10 0.64 9 
 Singapore  7.06 1 2.62 5  5.97 1 2.34 7 
 Thailand  2.33 4 3.07 3  2.55 4 2.94 3 
 Vietnam  1.95 5 0.97 8  2.53 5 1.46 8 
 China  0.54 11 4.72 2  0.45 13 6.04 2 
 Japan  0.46 12 6.19 1  0.49 12 6.40 1 
 Korea  1.29 7 2.37 7  1.70 7 2.61 4 
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Figure 2: Evolution of the asymmetry in the rank of the weighted degree centrality indexes 
(Rank in Out-degree – Rank in In-degree) 
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Table 7a: Trade centrality indices (X Network) 
 
Country  
1990 - 1997   1998 - 2005 
Eigenvec nEigenvec Rank   Hub Rank Authority Rank   Eigenvec nEigenvec Rank   Hub Rank Authority Rank 
Brunei  0.03 4.32 10  0.02 9 0.01 10  0.02 2.28 10  0.01 12 0.01 13 
Cambodia 0.00 0.63 12  0.00 12 0.00 12  0.01 0.71 12  0.00 13 0.01 12 
Indonesia 0.21 29.92 7  0.20 6 0.18 7  0.17 24.29 6  0.21 6 0.17 7 
Lao PDR 0.00 0.23 13  0.00 13 0.00 13  0.00 0.43 13  0.03 11 0.02 11 
Malaysia 0.28 39.45 5  0.24 5 0.32 5  0.22 30.79 5  0.26 4 0.27 5 
Myanmar 0.01 1.31 11  0.00 11 0.01 11  0.01 1.44 11  0.05 9 0.06 10 
Philippines 0.09 12.96 8  0.04 8 0.12 8  0.11 15.72 8  0.06 8 0.11 8 
Singapore 0.38 53.99 3  0.26 4 0.46 2  0.28 40.20 4  0.24 5 0.29 4 
Thailand 0.24 34.41 6  0.14 7 0.31 6  0.17 23.63 7  0.13 7 0.17 6 
Vietnam 0.03 4.59 9  0.02 10 0.03 9  0.05 7.75 9  0.04 10 0.07 9 
China 0.33 47.06 4  0.28 2 0.35 4  0.52 72.96 2  0.49 2 0.52 1 
Japan 0.63 88.44 1  0.81 1 0.39 3  0.59 82.76 1  0.59 1 0.46 2 
Korea 0.39 55.53 2  0.27 3 0.50 1  0.43 60.47 3  0.33 3 0.40 3 
 
Country  
2006 - 2010  2010 - 2013 
Eigenvec nEigenvec Rank   Hub Rank Authority Rank   Eigenvec nEigenvec Rank   Hub Rank Authority Rank 
Brunei  0.02 2.61 10  0.01 10 0.01 12  0.02 3.10 10  0.01 10 0.01 12 
Cambodia 0.01 0.99 12  0.00 13 0.01 11  0.01 1.67 12  0.00 13 0.01 11 
Indonesia 0.17 24.36 6  0.14 6 0.15 7  0.19 27.48 5  0.17 6 0.19 7 
Lao PDR 0.00 0.32 13  0.00 12 0.00 13  0.00 0.69 13  0.00 12 0.00 13 
Malaysia 0.18 25.39 5  0.17 5 0.19 5  0.19 27.19 6  0.18 5 0.19 6 
Myanmar 0.01 1.51 11  0.01 11 0.01 10  0.02 2.76 11  0.01 11 0.02 10 
Philippines 0.07 10.56 9  0.05 8 0.08 9  0.08 11.43 9  0.05 9 0.09 9 
Singapore 0.26 36.68 4  0.27 4 0.23 4  0.24 34.26 4  0.26 4 0.22 4 
Thailand 0.16 22.16 7  0.14 7 0.17 6  0.18 24.84 7  0.15 7 0.19 5 
Vietnam 0.09 12.70 8  0.04 9 0.09 8  0.14 20.04 8  0.07 8 0.15 8 
China 0.59 83.19 1  0.45 2 0.73 1  0.60 85.05 1  0.53 2 0.69 1 
Japan 0.54 76.59 2  0.67 1 0.40 2  0.50 70.95 2  0.56 1 0.46 2 
Korea 0.44 62.21 3  0.45 3 0.38 3  0.44 62.21 3  0.49 3 0.35 3 
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Table 7b: Trade centrality indices (X/GDP Network) 
 
Country  
1990 - 1997   1998 - 2005 
Eigenvec nEigenvec Rank   Hub Rank Authority Rank   Eigenvec nEigenvec Rank   Hub Rank Authority Rank 
Brunei 0.34 47.82 4  0.53 2 0.01 12  0.34 47.82 4  0.53 2 0.01 12 
Cambodia 0.03 3.64 13  0.03 12 0.01 11  0.03 3.64 13  0.03 12 0.01 11 
Indonesia 0.22 30.83 7  0.19 5 0.20 7  0.22 30.83 7  0.19 5 0.20 7 
Lao PDR 0.04 5.15 12  0.04 11 0.00 13  0.04 5.15 12  0.04 11 0.00 13 
Malaysia 0.40 57.06 3  0.36 3 0.40 2  0.40 57.06 3  0.36 3 0.40 2 
Myanmar 0.09 12.48 11  0.11 8 0.01 10  0.09 12.48 11  0.11 8 0.01 10 
Philippines 0.14 19.88 9  0.18 7 0.08 8  0.14 19.88 9  0.18 7 0.08 8 
Singapore 0.47 66.16 2  0.60 1 0.25 4  0.47 66.16 2  0.60 1 0.25 4 
Thailand 0.26 36.28 5  0.22 4 0.24 5  0.26 36.28 5  0.22 4 0.24 5 
Vietnam 0.14 19.41 10  0.19 6 0.05 9  0.14 19.41 10  0.19 6 0.05 9 
China 0.22 31.13 6  0.07 10 0.25 3  0.22 31.13 6  0.07 10 0.25 3 
Japan 0.48 68.01 1  0.02 13 0.70 1  0.48 68.01 1  0.02 13 0.70 1 
Korea 0.20 27.94 8  0.10 9 0.23 6  0.20 27.94 8  0.10 9 0.23 6 
 
Country  
2006 - 2010  2010 - 2013 
Eigenvec nEigenvec Rank   Hub Rank Authority Rank   Eigenvec nEigenvec Rank   Hub Rank Authority Rank 
Brunei 0.34 48.23 4  0.57 2 0.0078 12  0.38 54.17 3  0.64 1 0.01 12 
Cambodia 0.04 5.13 13  0.02 13 0.0162 10  0.08 10.58 12  0.07 11 0.02 10 
Indonesia 0.30 41.71 6  0.11 8 0.4076 3  0.22 31.61 9  0.11 8 0.27 4 
Lao PDR 0.05 7.09 12  0.05 11 0.0038 13  0.12 16.76 10  0.14 7 0.01 13 
Malaysia 0.36 50.34 3  0.30 3 0.3458 4  0.32 45.66 5  0.32 3 0.25 5 
Myanmar 0.08 11.90 11  0.09 9 0.0108 11  0.07 9.17 13  0.08 10 0.01 11 
Philippines 0.11 15.60 10  0.12 7 0.0748 9  0.09 12.95 11  0.11 9 0.06 9 
Singapore 0.48 67.28 1  0.65 1 0.1496 7  0.40 56.64 2  0.51 2 0.15 7 
Thailand 0.23 33.06 7  0.22 4 0.1824 6  0.24 33.84 7  0.24 5 0.19 6 
Vietnam 0.16 22.09 9  0.19 5 0.078 8  0.23 31.93 8  0.27 4 0.12 8 
China 0.33 46.66 5  0.05 10 0.4168 2  0.36 51.44 4  0.04 12 0.46 2 
Japan 0.41 58.53 2  0.04 12 0.6232 1  0.44 61.59 1  0.04 13 0.70 1 
Korea 0.23 32.64 8  0.13 6 0.2564 5  0.27 37.99 6  0.18 6 0.29 3 
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Table 8: FDI intensity indices  
 
Country 
Revealed inward stock 
preference 
 Revealed outward 
stock preference 
 Revealed FDI 
leadership 
2001-2006 2007-2012  2001-2006 2007-2012  2001-2006 2007-2012 
ASEAN         
Brunei Darussalam   -0.74 -0.65  0.94 0.93  0.84 0.79 
 Cambodia  0.90 0.81  -0.75 0.37  -0.82 -0.22 
 Indonesia  -1.00 0.17  0.16 0.89  0.58 0.36 
 Lao PDR  0.14 0.83  -0.14 0.79  -0.14 -0.02 
 Malaysia  -1.00 0.36  -1.00 0.61  0.00 0.15 
 Myanmar  0.79 0.78  0.00 0.00  -0.40 -0.39 
 Philippines  0.43 0.04  -1.00 -0.17  -0.72 -0.11 
 Singapore  -0.13 -0.28  0.88 0.31  0.51 0.55 
 Thailand  0.52 0.59  0.92 0.92  0.20 0.16 
 Vietnam  0.23 0.26  0.00 0.00  -0.11 -0.13 
ASEAN+3 
        
 Brunei Darussalam   -0.75 -0.52  0.73 0.69  0.74 0.60 
 Cambodia  0.93 0.95  -0.93 -0.35  -0.93 -0.65 
 Indonesia  -1.00 0.25  0.18 0.88  0.59 0.32 
 Lao PDR  0.49 0.98  -0.36 0.65  -0.42 -0.20 
 Malaysia  -1.00 0.32  -1.00 0.35  0.00 0.01 
 Myanmar  0.50 0.72  0.00 0.00  -0.25 -0.36 
 Philippines  0.96 0.93  -1.00 -0.30  -0.98 -0.62 
 Singapore  0.71 0.59  0.70 0.69  -0.01 0.05 
 Thailand  0.95 0.97  0.73 0.80  -0.11 -0.09 
 Vietnam  0.78 0.91  0.00 0.00  -0.39 -0.45 
 China  0.75 0.54  -0.62 -0.70  -0.69 -0.62 
 Japan  -0.23 0.16  0.06 0.09  0.15 -0.03 
 Korea  0.92 0.93  0.69 0.46  -0.12 -0.23 
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Table 9: FDI degree centrality indices 
 
Country 
  Unweighted Degree Centrality  
 2001-2006   2007-2012  
  n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank   n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank 
 Brunei   0.17 10 0.18 13  0.24 11 0.25 13 
 Cambodia   0.08 13 0.57 4  0.24 10 0.58 6 
 Indonesia   0.51 6 0.39 9  0.53 8 0.54 7 
 Lao PDR   0.17 11 0.22 12  0.17 13 0.33 11 
 Malaysia   0.47 7 0.42 8  0.72 6 0.50 10 
 Myanmar   0.14 12 0.31 11  0.19 12 0.33 12 
 Philippines   0.43 8 0.56 5  0.56 7 0.63 4 
 Singapore   0.99 2 0.83 1  1.00 1 1.00 1 
 Thailand   0.83 3 0.46 7  0.87 4 0.97 2 
 Vietnam   0.22 9 0.36 10  0.28 9 0.51 9 
 China   0.71 4 0.61 3  1.00 2 0.65 3 
 Japan   0.61 5 0.56 6  0.74 5 0.61 5 
 Korea   1.00 1 0.75 2  0.96 3 0.53 8 
           
 
Country 
 
  Weighted Degree Centrality  (Stock of FDI) 
 2001-2006   2007-2012  
  n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank   n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank 
 Brunei   17.39 7 3.68 13  19.52 9 13.54 13 
 Cambodia   0.15 11 23.27 11  2.01 12 261.55 11 
 Indonesia   181.19 4 1266.64 2  328.76 7 4116.99 3 
 Lao PDR   0.36 10 8.07 12  1.00 13 143.39 12 
 Malaysia   0.00 12 1191.95 3  3126.89 4 2892.48 5 
 Myanmar   0.53 9 96.50 10  4.45 10 433.70 10 
 Philippines   0.00 13 481.83 7  98.87 8 1196.41 8 
 Singapore   3337.14 2 1141.83 5  10495.34 2 4693.19 2 
 Thailand   175.42 5 1186.56 4  1053.78 6 3852.11 4 
 Vietnam   1.14 8 205.56 8  3.41 11 1299.64 7 
 China   162.38 6 3613.58 1  1368.02 5 12675.47 1 
 Japan   5068.11 1 178.50 9  13955.27 1 1001.82 9 
 Korea    1265.52 3 756.95 6   4315.83 3 1638.77 6 
 
 
Country 
 
  Weighted Degree Centrality  (Stock of FDI / GDP) 
 2001-2006   2007-2012  
  n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank   n-Outdegree Rank n-Indegree Rank 
 Brunei   0.0285 2 0.0002 12  0.0170 6 0.0007 13 
 Cambodia   0.0002 10 0.0017 11  0.0020 10 0.0043 11 
 Indonesia   0.0093 6 0.0628 3  0.0063 7 0.1425 2 
 Lao PDR   0.0010 7 0.0002 13  0.0018 11 0.0027 12 
 Malaysia   0.0000 11 0.0810 2  0.1218 2 0.1000 4 
 Myanmar   0.0003 9 0.0088 10  0.0018 12 0.0132 10 
 Philippines   0.0000 12 0.0190 6  0.0037 8 0.0215 8 
 Singapore   0.3530 1 0.0393 5  0.5492 1 0.1025 3 
 Thailand   0.0128 5 0.0397 4  0.0395 4 0.0850 5 
 Vietnam   0.0000 13 0.0125 8  0.0000 13 0.0248 7 
 China   0.0007 8 0.1447 1  0.0027 9 0.2765 1 
 Japan   0.0140 4 0.0123 9  0.0310 5 0.0373 6 
 Korea    0.0198 3 0.0175 7   0.0467 3 0.0135 9 
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Table 10a: FDI centrality indices in the weighted Networks (FDI) 
 
Country 
  
2001-2006  
2007-2012 
 
nEigenvec Rank 
 
Hub Rank 
 
Authority Rank 
 
nEigenvec Rank 
 
Hub Rank 
 
Authority Rank 
 Brunei Darussalam   
 
0.400 11 
 
0.002 7 
 
0.001 13 
 
0.164 13 
 
0.001 9 
 
0.001 13 
 Cambodia  
 
0.411 12 
 
0.000 10 
 
0.003 11 
 
1.225 11 
 
0.000 13 
 
0.005 11 
 Indonesia  
 
30.024 5 
 
0.042 5 
 
0.295 4 
 
24.738 6 
 
0.022 6 
 
0.236 3 
 Lao PDR  
 
0.134 13 
 
0.000 10 
 
0.001 12 
 
0.792 12 
 
0.000 12 
 
0.002 12 
 Malaysia  
 
26.871 7 
 
0.000 10 
 
0.277 5 
 
23.027 7 
 
0.058 4 
 
0.210 5 
 Myanmar  
 
1.603 10 
 
0.000 9 
 
0.012 10 
 
2.552 10 
 
0.000 10 
 
0.016 10 
 Philippines  
 
10.958 8 
 
0.000 10 
 
0.120 7 
 
8.473 8 
 
0.002 8 
 
0.091 7 
 Singapore  
 
67.351 3 
 
0.524 2 
 
0.310 2 
 
65.905 3 
 
0.577 2 
 
0.220 4 
 Thailand  
 
27.830 6 
 
0.017 4 
 
0.306 3 
 
29.541 5 
 
0.032 5 
 
0.304 2 
 Vietnam  
 
3.150 9 
 
0.000 8 
 
0.024 9 
 
6.521 9 
 
0.000 11 
 
0.059 8 
 China  
 
72.186 2 
 
0.006 6 
 
0.760 1 
 
80.112 1 
 
0.022 7 
 
0.849 1 
 Japan  
 
79.308 1 
 
0.812 1 
 
0.027 8 
 
76.075 2 
 
0.758 1 
 
0.047 9 
 Korea    37.144 4   0.250 3   0.207 6   35.700 4   0.289 3   0.140 6 
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Table 10b: FDI centrality indices in the weighted Networks (FDI/GDP) 
 
Country 
  
2001-2006  
2007-2012 
 
nEigenvec Rank 
 
Hub Rank 
 
Authority Rank 
 
nEigenvec Rank 
 
Hub Rank 
 
Authority Rank 
 Brunei Darussalam   
 
17.1327 6 
 
0.0003 8 
 
0.0023 11 
 
5.9227 9 
 
0.0015 9 
 
0.0022 13 
 Cambodia  
 
0.7010 12 
 
0.0002 9 
 
0.0072 10 
 
0.7415 12 
 
0.0010 11 
 
0.0040 11 
 Indonesia  
 
36.5607 4 
 
0.0253 4 
 
0.3545 3 
 
39.2337 4 
 
0.0103 6 
 
0.3623 2 
 Lao PDR  
 
0.2617 13 
 
0.0005 6 
 
0.0022 12 
 
0.6235 13 
 
0.0020 7 
 
0.0028 12 
 Malaysia  
 
46.6070 3 
 
0.0000 10 
 
0.4867 2 
 
40.0742 3 
 
0.0832 3 
 
0.3408 3 
 Myanmar  
 
3.8705 11 
 
0.0000 12 
 
0.0368 9 
 
3.6512 11 
 
0.0003 12 
 
0.0363 9 
 Philippines  
 
10.0818 8 
 
0.0000 11 
 
0.1035 5 
 
6.1740 8 
 
0.0015 8 
 
0.0610 6 
 Singapore  
 
98.7752 1 
 
0.9972 1 
 
0.0020 13 
 
96.9638 1 
 
0.9893 1 
 
0.0232 10 
 Thailand  
 
22.7742 5 
 
0.0162 5 
 
0.2210 4 
 
26.7727 5 
 
0.0332 5 
 
0.2447 4 
 Vietnam  
 
5.1215 10 
 
0.0000 13 
 
0.0495 8 
 
4.6872 10 
 
0.0000 13 
 
0.0393 7 
 China  
 
73.2335 2 
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Figure 3: Changes in ASEAN+3’s trade mapping 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Source: Authors’ creation’  
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Figure 4: Changes in ASEAN+3’s FDI mapping 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Source: Authors’ creation 
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Table 11a: Pearson Correlation Matrix of the measures of the 2012 weighted network 
(Flows of X or stock of FDI). 
 X FDI 
OutDeg InDeg Eig. Hub Auth. OutDeg InDeg Eig Hub Auth 
X 
OutDeg 1                   
InDeg 0.987 1                 
Eig. 0.984 0.97 1               
Hub 0.948 0.907 0.978 1             
Auth. 0.982 0.994 0.979 0.917 1           
FDI 
OutDeg 0.779 0.798 0.681 0.554 0.775 1         
InDeg 0.504 0.428 0.571 0.709 0.421 -0.051 1       
Eig. 0.96 0.931 0.93 0.914 0.912 0.763 0.604 1     
Hub 0.783 0.802 0.688 0.56 0.782 1 -0.053 0.762 1   
Auth. 0.501 0.43 0.561 0.685 0.423 -0.008 0.985 0.627 -0.01 1 
 
 
Table 11b: Pearson Correlation Matrix of the measures of the 2012 weighted network 
(Flows of X to GDP, or stock of FDI to GDP). 
 X/GDP FDI/GDP 
OutDeg InDeg Eig. Hub Auth. OutDeg InDeg Eig Hub Auth 
X/GDP 
OutDeg 1                   
InDeg -0.29 1                 
Eig. 0.434 0.663 1               
Hub 0.934 -0.326 0.463 1             
Auth. -0.353 0.952 0.642 -0.361 1           
FDI/GDP 
OutDeg 0.716 0.085 0.416 0.474 -0.003 1         
InDeg -0.118 0.614 0.358 -0.175 0.408 0.167 1       
Eig. 0.325 0.496 0.514 0.156 0.298 0.695 0.82 1     
Hub 0.671 0.071 0.377 0.432 -0.015 0.984 0.151 0.685 1   
Auth. -0.314 0.613 0.272 -0.296 0.437 -0.123 0.944 0.61 -0.158 1 
           Source: Authors’ creation 
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Figure 5: Specialization as measured by asymmetry in network rankings in 2012 
 
 
           Source: Authors’ creation 
 
 
